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Abstract. One of the major open problems in symmetric cryptanalysis
is to discover new specific types of invariant properties which can hold
for a larger number of rounds of a block cipher. We have Generalised
Linear Cryptanalysis (GLC) and Partitioning Cryptanalysis (PC). Due
to double-exponential combinatorial explosion of the number of possible
invariant properties systematic exploration is not possible and extremely
few positive working examples of GLC are known. Our answer is to work
with polynomial algebraic invariants which makes partitions more intel-
ligible. We have developed a constructive algebraic approach which is
about making sure that a certain combination of polynomial equations
is zero. We work with an old block cipher from 1980s which has particu-
larly large hardware complexity compared to modern ciphers e.g. AES.
However all this complexity is not that useful if we are able to construct
powerful non-linear invariants which work for any number of rounds. A
key feature of our invariant attacks is that we are able to completely
eliminate numerous state and key bits. We also construct invariants for
the (presumably stronger) KT1 keys. Some of these lead to powerful
ciphertext-only correlation attacks.
Key Words: block ciphers, Boolean functions, ANF, Feistel ciphers, history
of cryptography, T-310, Linear Cryptanalysis, Generalized Linear Cryptanaly-
sis, Partitioning Cryptanalysis, polynomial invariants, symmetric polynomials,
algebraic cryptanalysis, cycling attacks, higher-order correlation attacks.
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21 Introduction, Non-Linear Cryptanalysis
The concept of cryptanalysis with non-linear polynomials a.k.a. Generalized Lin-
ear Cryptanalysis (GLC) was introduced by Harpes, Kramer, and Massey at Eu-
rocrypt’95, cf. [16]. A key question is the existence of round-invariant I/O sums:
when a value of a certain polynomial is preserved after 1 round. Many researchers
have in the past failed to find any such properties, cf. for example Knudsen and
Robshaw at Eurocrypt’96 cf. [19] and there are extremely few positive results
on this topic, cf. recent result [25]. A paper at Crypto 2004 cf. [7] provides the
following hint: non-linear polynomial I/O sums can eventually be made to work
if we consider that the choice of monomials will strongly depend on the structure
and internal wiring of the cipher. Bi-Linear and Multi-Linear cryptanalysis were
subsequently introduced [7,8] in order to work with Feistel ciphers with two and
several branches specifically. In this paper we revisit the question of non-linear
cryptanalysis and give it a fresh start. Rather than building from scratch some
highly contrived new ciphers [1,8,9] we are going to construct a more substan-
tial variety of round invariant properties, on demand, for a given (more natural)
real-life block cipher setting. Our work is rather disjoint w.r.t. recent high-profile
results in [25] dealing primarily with SPN ciphers, we focus more on Feistel ci-
phers. Moreover unlike in [25] we focus on invariants which work for 100 % of
the keys and we focus on stronger invariants which hold with probability equal
to 1 (accordingly the key schedule is less relevant here).
1.1 Combinatorial or Algebraic, Partitioning Cryptanalysis
A classical open problem in cryptanalysis is discovery of invariant or semi-
invariant properties of complex type, cf. recent paper [25]. The space of solu-
tions is double exponential and many authors stress that systematic exploration
is rather impossible [3]. There are two major approaches to our problem: com-
binatorial and algebraic. A naive combinatorial approach would be to try to
modify the connections of the cipher and test (more or less at random) for a
desired property. A better approach is to make more constants variable and con-
sider constraint satisfaction problems with formal coding and SAT solvers. We
propose a more meaningful and compact “algebraic” approach with polynomial
equations. A major novelty here is to consider that Boolean functions are also
unknowns which can be determined rather than fixed and they could be weak
maybe only w.r.t one very specific cipher setup. Our multivariate polynomial
coding is compact and allows precise understanding when and why a cipher could
be weak and many very precise results (up to “if and only if type”).
A well known very general (combinatorial) approach considers arbitrary sub-
sets of binary vector spaces, and it is called Partitioning Cryptanalysis (PC), cf.
[1,17,18]. A more algebraic approach is to consider only specific forms of parti-
tions, mainly those defined by the value (0 or 1) of a single Boolean polynomial.
This is of course less general, BUT it leads to a more effective approach to the
problem, effective in the sense that we expect that properties are described, dis-
covered and studied with the tools of algebra. In particular new very interesting
questions can be asked, and we expect properties to be computed or derived
3rather than to happen by some incredible coincidence. In other terms we expect
the algebraic approach to be more illuminating about what actually happens and
also easier to study. More importantly in this paper we put forward an algebraic
discovery approach of a new sort. Our problem will be coded with a surpris-
ingly simple single equation of a limited degree which we will call FE. Solving
such equation(s), there will be up to 8 such equations as we will see, guaran-
tees that we obtain a Boolean function and the polynomial invariant P which
makes a block cipher weak. Moreover when this equation FE reduces to zero, our
invariant becomes stronger in the sense of holding for a larger space of Boolean
functions, cf. Section 6.2 and Section 9.4. Solving FE also avoids exploring the
vast space of possible Boolean functions (this again would be a combinatorial
approach). Specific examples will be constructed based on a highly complex his-
torical block cipher. We construct several examples where the set of solutions is
not empty which demonstrates that our attack actually works.
1.2 Weak vs. Strong Keys and Ciphers
The question of weak keys has not received sufficient attention in cryptography
research. The single key attack is certainly not a correct way to evaluate a
security of a cipher. Almost every cipher in the real life is used with multiple
random keys, and the attacker only needs to break some fraction of the keys.
There are numerous constructions of weak ciphers in cryptographic literature, cf.
for example work related to the AES S-box [8,9], and very recent constructions
in [1,2]. A serious theory is nowadays being developed around what is possible or
not to achieve in partitioning and invariant attacks, with important notions of
strongly proper transformations and anti-invariant resistance, cf. [3,2]. There are
two major types of invariants in recent research: linear or sub-space invariants,
and proper non-linear invariants. Several authors [3,2] including this paper study
both. Almost all research in this area revolves around the fundamental notion
of Partitioning1 Cryptanalysis (PC) cf. [1,17] and PC can be linear or non-
linear and generalizes both LC and GLC [17]. These works are closely related
and also to the study of the groups generated by various cipher transformations
[22,21,23,8,9]. In this paper we contend that the partitioning approach is too
general. It helps to establish some impossibility results [3,2], yet it obscures any
possibility results.
What’s New? We can discover some invariant properties but do we understand
their nature? Can we manipulate the properties efficiently and compress them
(represent in a compact way)? Can we discover properties with some effective
computational methods and see how various constraints will imply their exis-
tence or not? Can we show that some ciphers are going to be secure against such
attacks? Can we construct weak keys secure w.r.t. simpler (e.g. linear) invari-
ants and previously known attacks? Yes we can, and our polynomial algebraic
discovery approach is what makes all these possible.
1 In fact what we do in this paper is ALSO partitioning cryptanalysis, except that
our partitions are characterized by a [single] multivariate polynomial.
4Mathematical Theory of Invariants. There exists an extensive theory of
multivariate polynomial algebraic invariants going back to 1845 [14]. However
mathematicians have studied primarily invariants w.r.t. linear transformations(!).
Moreover the classical invariant theory has very rarely considered invariants with
more than 5 variables and in finite fields of small size. In our work we study
invariants w.r.t non-linear transformations (!!!) and with up to 36 variables
over GF (2). A well-known polynomial invariant with applications in symmetric
cryptography is the cross-ratio, studied in Sect. 4 in [8] and in the “whitening
paradox”2 cf. [8,9].
2 Notation and Methodology
In this paper we are going to work with one specific block cipher in order to show
that non-linear cryptanalysis can be made to work. We do not provide a full
description of an encryption system (how it is initialized and used etc). We just
concentrate on how one block cipher round operates and how it translates into
relatively simple Boolean polynomials. Quite importantly, we consider, which is
rarely done in cryptanalysis, that the Boolean function is an unknown, yet to
be determined. We will denote this function by a special variable Z. We will
then postulate that Z may satisfy a certain algebraic equation [with additional
variables] and then this equation will be solved in order to determine Z.
In order to have notations, which are as compact as possible, in this paper
the sign + will denote addition modulo 2, frequently we will omit the sign *
in products and will frequently use short or single letter variable names. In
general in this paper we will use small letters a− z, and x1, x36 or e1 for various
binary variables ∈ {0, 1}. Certain capital letters S1, S2,K, L, F, Z will be used
to represent some very “special” sorts of variables which are placeholders for
something more complex. In particular the capital letter Z is a placeholder for
substitution of the following kind
Z(e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6)
where e1 . . . e6 will be some 6 of the other variables. In practice, the ei will
represent a specific subset of variables of type a-z, or other such as L, therefore
at the end, our substitution will actually look like:
Z ← Z00 + Z01 ∗ L + Z02 ∗ c + Z03 ∗ Lc + . . . + Z62 ∗ cklfh + Z63 ∗ Lcklfh
Other capital letters will be used to signify some bits which are also unknown
which will be bits of the secret key used in a given round and such bits are in
our work called by letters S1, S2, where S2 will be sometimes renamed L and
S1 can be also called K. We also use a capital letter to represent some bits
which depend on the IV, or a round-dependent variable constants. This sort of
variable is typically known to the attacker and will be denoted by the letter F .
Our notations would typically omit to specify in which round of encryption these
bits are taken, as most of our work is about constructing one round invariants
2 The “paradox” is a proof of concept that a group-theoretic claims in cryptography
[22,23] can be highly misleading and can lead to ciphers which are insecure [9].
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in general that each round of encryption will be identical except that they can
differ only in some “public” bits called F (and known to the attacker) and some
“secret” bits called S1, S2 or K,L and unknown to the attacker. These bits will
be different in different rounds. This framework covers most block ciphers ever
made except that some ciphers will have more “secret” bits in one round.
2.1 Polynomial Invariants
We are looking for arbitrary polynomial invariants coded as formal polynomi-
als and the structure of the polynomial is provided or guessed by the attacker
depending on “heuristics” based on the high-level structure of the cipher fol-
lowing the ideas of [7]. This frequently, but not3 at all in general, will lead to
combinations of symmetric polynomials like:
P(a, b, . . .) = P51 ∗ (e + f + g + h) + P42 ∗ (abc + abd + acd + bcd) + . . .
We will avoid completely general polynomials which would be too costly to con-
sider and process efficiently. In addition we will attempt to reduce (e.g. through a
row-echelon process studied later in Section 7.3) the number of variables such as
P51 determined at a later “algebraic solving” stage of our attack. In this paper
we try to strike a balance between a completely general constructive approach
applicable to any block cipher, and constructing simple examples dictated by
the high-level structure of one specific Feistel cipher. In theory, our approach
is totally general as every function could be written as a polynomial over a fi-
nite field, therefore in a very broad (and naive) sense Partitioning Cryptanalysis
(PC) and Generalized Linear Cryptanalysis are equivalent. In practice, we will
be working with sets characterized by one polynomial at a time, polynomials are
specific type, and our computational ability to solve the equations is limited.
3 Some of our polynomials are very far from being symmetric, e.g. in Section 4.1. we
have P such that P−fg is a symmetric homogenous polynomial, in another example
P has only 2 monomials of degree 2, cf. Section 9.2.
62.2 Our Specific Cipher
In this paper we are going however to work primarily on a particularly complex
Feistel cipher on 4 branches known as T-310. T-310 was the principal encryption
algorithm used to protect various state communication lines in Eastern Germany,
and until 1989 some 3,800 cipher machines were in active service [13,24,10,22].
The block size is 36 bits and the key has 240 bits. We are going to explore
the space of invariants on 36 bits and study Boolean functions on 6 bits, some
of which may lead to specific invariant attacks. There are 22
6
= 264 Boolean
functions on 6 bits and an incredibly large number 22
36
of possible invariants.
Fig. 1. T-310: a peculiar sort of Compressing Unbalanced Feistel scheme cf.
[20,10].
2.3 Constructive Approach Given the Cipher Wiring
We decided to execute our task on a cipher which offers great flexibility in the
choice of the internal wiring, so that we can possibly make such adjustments
if we do not find a property we are looking for. Most ciphers such as DES or
AES also have this sort of flexibility in the choice of P-boxes, arbitrary invertible
matrices inside the S-box, inside the mixing layers, etc. Here we work with the T-
310 cipher from 1980s where such changes are officially allowed and are officially
specified by the designers of the cipher. Here if we find a weak setup, and we will,
it can be directly implemented with original historical hardware. Our work is
at the antipodes compared to [8,9] where the ciphers are really very special and
have very strong high-level structure. Our approach is really the opposite: we
start from any given cipher spec in forms of ANFs for one round and we generate
complex invariant properties essentially on demand. Our approach is applicable
7to more or less any block cipher which contains non-linear components, and also
to most hash functions and stream ciphers based on a core block cipher.
In the picture below we show the internal structure of T-310, one of the most
important block ciphers of the Cold War, massively used to encrypt all sorts
of state communications, cf. [24]. T-310 is one of the most “paranoid” cipher
designs we have ever seen. The cipher is iterated hundreds of times per one
bit actually encrypted. The hardware complexity of T-310 is hundreds of times
bigger than AES or 3DES, cf. [12,13]. Does it make this cipher very secure? Not
quite, if we can construct algebraic invariants which work for any number of
rounds.
Fig. 2. The internal structure of one round of T-310 block cipher.
The cipher operates on 36-bit blocks and the state bits are numbered 1-
36. The bit numbering in this compressing unbalanced Feistel cipher with 4
branches is such, cf. Fig 1, that bits 1, 5, 9 . . . 33 are those freshly created by
this round, while ALL the input bits the numbers of which are NOT multiples
of 4 are shifted by 1 position, i.e. bit 1 becomes 2 in the next round, and bit
35 becomes 36. Few things remain unspecified on our picture: which bits and
in which order are connected to D1-D9 and v1-v27. In T-310 this specification
is called an LZS or Langzeitschlu¨ssel which means a long-term key and which
is distinct than the short-term key on 240 bits. We simply need to specify two
functions4 D : {1 . . . 9} → {0 . . . 36}, P : {1 . . . 27} → {1 . . . 36}. For example
D(5) = 36 will mean that input bit 36 is connected to the wire D5 on our picture,
and P (1) = 25 will mean that input 25 is connected as v1 or the 1st input of
Z1. Finally the internal wiring LZS uses a special convention where the bit S1
is used instead of one of the Di by specifying that D(i) = 0. Overall one round
4 Which are both assumed to be injective and D(i) are always multiples of 4, this in
order to avoid many degenerate cases and trivial attacks cf. [10].
8can be described as 36 Boolean polynomials out of which only 9 are non-trivial.
Let x1, . . . , x36 be the inputs and let y1, . . . , y36 be the outputs.
y33 = F + xD(9)
Z1
def
= Z(S2, xP (1),. . . ,xP (5)))
y29 = F + Z1 + xD(8)
y25 = F + Z1 + xP (6) + xD(7)
Z2
def
= Z(xP (7), . . . , xP (12))
y21 = F + Z1 + xP (6) + Z2+ xD(6)
y17 = F + Z1 + xP (6) + Z2+ xP (13) + xD(5)
Z3
def
= Z(xP (14), . . . , xP (19))
y13 = F + Z1 + xP (6) + Z2+ xP (13) + S2 + Z3 + xD(4)
y9 = F + Z1 + xP (6) + Z2+ xP (13) + S2 + Z3 + xP (20) + xD(3)
Z4
def
= Z(xP (21), . . . , xP (26))
y5 = F + Z1 + xP (6) + Z2+ xP (13) + S2 + Z3 + xP (20)+Z4+xD(2)
y1 = F + Z1 + xP (6) + Z2+ xP (13) + S2 + Z3 + xP (20)+Z4+xP (27)+xD(1)
x0
def
= S1
yi+1 = xi for all other i 6= 4k ( with 1 ≤ i ≤ 36)
Here F is a public bit derived from an IV transmitted in the cleartext, S1 and
S2 are bits of the secret key on 240 bits. S1 and S2 are repeated every 120 steps,
and the key scheduling is weak, cf. our correlation attack in Section 8.
We will now migrate towards more convenient and shorter notations. We
emphasise the fact that the variables xi and yi are treated “alike” and we will
call them by lowercase letters a-z backwards starting from x36 till x11 and y36
till y11. Then we use capital letters M -V (avoiding some letters used elsewhere).
For example a = x36 and t = x17, and M = x10 and V = x1. The reader may be
surprised to see that in our cryptanalysis efforts we attempt to map xi to yi (they
are denoted by the same letter) and this for ALL the 36 variables simultaneously
and this after exactly 1 round. This even though for almost all variables xi = yi−1
after one round. This is not impossible, not even in Linear Cryptanalysis (LC).
For example if a
def
= x36 in input expressions, and also used to denote y36 for
output expressions b
def
= y35 and also used to denote y35, it is unthinkable that
say a is an invariant property if we replace a ← b in the next round. However
a+ b+ c+d absolutely CAN be an invariant for one round (!). This, only IF our
cipher had ANY invariant linear property true with probability 1 for 1 round
which is possible but not so common. A recent paper shows that this can occur
for about 3% of the so called officially approved KT1 keys cf. [12]. In our paper
we will be of course looking at what happens for the remaining stronger 97 %
of LZS keys and at more general non-linear polynomial expressions such as say
ef + fg + eh + gh. All examples we give in this paper are real-life examples.
9The Result After Renaming. Overall, depending on the exact values of D(i)
and P (j), we can rewrite the beginning of our equation system as follows. The
variables on the left hand side will be output variables after 1 round, and on the
right hand side, we have ANF or polynomials in the input variables.
a← b
b← c
c← d
d← F + i
[. . .]
h← F + Z + e
[. . .]
Z1← Z(L, j, h, f, p, d))
z ←M
M ← N
N ← F + Z + r + Y + m + L + X + x + k
[. . .]
Z4← Z(a, g, c, z, U, i)
R← F + Z + r + Y + m + L + X + W + x
[. . .]
V ← F + Z + r + Y + m + L + X + W + x + w
These expressions should be viewed as a sequence of substitutions where a vari-
able is replaced by a polynomial algebraic expression. In order to have shorter
expressions to manipulate we replaced here Z1 − Z4 by shorter abbreviations
Z, Y,X,W respectively. We also replaced S2 by a single letter L (used at 2
places). The other key bits S1 will only be used at one place if some D(i) = 0.
An observation is that the algebraic degree of all our ANF expressions is con-
stant and at most 6. Now the only thing which remains to be done is to find a
polynomial expression P say
P(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, . . .) = abcdijkl + efg + efh + egh + fgh
using any number between 1 and 36 variables such that if we substitute in
P all the variables by the substitutions defined above in Section 2.3, we would
get exactly the same polynomial expression P .
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3 The Fundamental Equation
We want to find a polynomial expression P using any number between 1 and 36
variables such that it is an invariant after the substitutions of Section 2.3. For
example if the polynomial P is fixed5, and also in other cases, the attacker will
write ONE SINGLE (or more) algebraic equation which he is going to solve to
determine the unknown Boolean function Z (and P) if a solution exists.
Definition 3.1 (Compact Uni/Quadri-variate FE). Our “Fundamental Equa-
tion (FE)” to solve is simply a substitution like:
P(Inputs) = P(Outputs)
or more precisely
P(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, . . .) = P(b, c, d, F + i, f, g, h, F + Z1 + e, . . .)
where again Z1 − Z4 are replaced by Z, Y,X,W . In the next step, Z will
be represented by an Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) with 64 binary variables
which are the coefficients of the ANF of Z, and there will be several equations,
and four instances Z, Y,X,W of the same Z:
Definition 3.2 (A Multivariate FE). At this step we will rewrite FE as
follows. We will replace Z1 by:
Z ← Z00 + Z01 ∗ L + Z02 ∗ j + Z03 ∗ Lj + . . . + Z62 ∗ jhfpd + Z63 ∗ Ljhfpd
Likewise we will also replace Z2:
Y ← Z00 + Z01 ∗ k + Z02 ∗ l + Z03 ∗ kl + . . . + Z62 ∗ loent + Z63 ∗ kloent
and likewise for X = Z3 and W = Z4 and the coefficients Z00 . . . Z63 will be
the same inside Z1−Z4, however the subsets of 6 variables chosen out of 36 will
be different in Z1− Z4. Moreover, some coefficients of P may also be variable.
Initially, we can select P as an arbitrary fixed polynomial, with degree say
between 2 and 26. Then if we cannot find a solution, we will enlarge the space
of solutions but making more or all coefficients of P variable. In all cases, all we
need to do is to solve the equation above for Z, plus a variable amount of extra
variables. This formal algebraic approach, if it has a solution, still called Z for
simplicity, or (P, Z) will guarantee that our invariant P holds for 1 round.
The process is as we can see EXTREMELY SIMPLE: we assume that a
certain equation holds for Z and we solve it for Z which is 64 binary unknowns
for the ANF coefficients, (for example using a SAT solver). Our experience seems
to show that this problem will rarely be actually computationally really hard.
This depends on many factors such as size, degree and shape of P. Moreover
the dimension of the space of P can be reduced by specific ad-hoc requirements
decided by the attacker, cf. Section 7.3.
5 One simple method is to select a specific short symmetric polynomial which have
already been seen to work. In practice P is not completely fixed and rather selected
to belong to a certain (reduced) space of multivariate polynomials.
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3.3 The Solvability Problem
A major problem is now the existence of solutions. Does this equation FE
have a solution? Or, does it have solutions which would satisfy some additional
requirements required to design any sort of meaningful cryptanalytic attack?
There are, as the reader may guess, countless cases where this problem has no
solution whatsoever. In many interesting cases this equation will be unusually
simple and sometimes it will disappear totally, cf. Sections 6.2 and 9.4.
3.4 What is New
A previous paper on this topic [4] emphasises invariants of low degree which
are irreducible in cases without linear attacks and when the Boolean function
and the long-term keys quite special. In this paper we are looking for better
attacks. We show that invariants of higher degrees are more powerful and lead
to internal correlation attacks which can also work with KT1 keys and for any
Boolean function.
4 A Toy Example which Does Not Work Well
Our approach is to construct toy ciphers fully compliant with the spec of T-310
cipher and which are weak w.r.t. non-linear cryptanalysis. In general countless
interesting invariants exist for this cipher. These examples were constructed
rather than found, by combination of paper and pencil work on FE with some
heuristics and ad-hoc assumptions, with some computer simulations in order to
satisfy some additional criteria, mainly resistance to other known attacks, and
the ability to eliminate many state and key bits so that they can be eventually
used to cryptanalyse our cipher. We start with some toy examples chosen for
their elegance and simplicity which do not yet work very well.
4.1 A Toy Example with P of Degree 3 and 4 Variables and F = 0
We start with the following very simple non-linear round invariant property P
which is particularly simple and uses only 4 variables:
P = efg + efh + egh + fgh + fg
Our polynomial is such that P − fg is a symmetric homogenous polynomial
of degree 3 in 4 variables only. However it is important to note that overall P is
NOT a symmetric polynomial. and it is also irreducible6. Consider the following
long term key setup:
317: P=27,29,31,21,33,19,26,25,22,32,23,17,24,16,18,9,5,
10,35,13,36,30,34,11,2,28,14 D=17,25,26,35,18,34,30,32,28
What is the solution Z? All we need to do is to write our Fundamental Equation
(FE) and substitute four variables using the ANF round equations in page 9.
P(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, . . .) = P(b, c, d, F + i, f, g, h, F + Z1 + e, . . .)
6 We refer to later Section 8 and Appendix A to see why this matters.
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On the right hand side we replace a← b, etc, up to h← F + Z1 + e.
Our Fundamental Equation (FE) becomes:
F (fg + fh + gh) + Z(fg + fh + gh) + gh + fg
We will now assume F = 0. We get:
Z(fg + fh + gh) + fg + gh
Due to absence of variables p and t in P, this equation FE contains only Z
and not Y . FE becomes: Z(fg+fh+gh) = fg+gh. Then we need to substitute
Z by an expression of type
Z00 + Z01 ∗ L + Z02 ∗ j + Z03 ∗ L ∗ j + Z04 ∗ h + Z05 ∗ L ∗ h + . . .
with the correct 6 variables L, j, h, f, p, d in the correct order. FE becomes then:
(LZ33+LZ41+Z32+Z40)*dfg + ... up to ... (LZ17+LZ21+Z16+Z20)*ghp
From here we obtain a system of simultaneous almost-linear (except few variables
multiplied by L) equations starting with:
L*Z33+L*Z41+Z32+Z40=0 ... up to ... L*Z17+L*Z21+Z16+Z20=0
There are many solutions to this equation. For example when Z(a, b, c, d, e, f) =
a+ d+ ad+ cd+ f + af our cipher has no linear invariants. This cipher setting
is not vulnerable to Linear Cryptanalysis (LC) in none of the eight cases
depending on if F = 0 or 1, L = 0 or 1 or K = 0 or 1.
4.2 A Major Problem - Simultaneous Solving
It is possible to see that when F = 1, the same LZS 317 also has a non-linear
invariant for the same Z = a+ d+ ad+ cd+ f + af which is actually of degree
2: P = ef + fg + eh + gh and which is not irreducible. A “slight” problem is
that the invariant P is not the same as when F = 0. We have not yet broken a
block cipher.
We need to simultaneously solve a set of 2 fundamental equations when F = 0
and F = 1. Or a set of up to 8 fundamental equations for different choices of
F, S1, S2. We write up to 8 because quite frequently some of these are identical
which is to our advantage. Would such a set of equations have a solution at all?
4.3 Impossibility Results and Provable Security
If this cannot be done, we would like to be able to prove mathematically that
our FE has no solution and this attack is impossible for our cipher. There
exist some general results of this type in cryptanalysis, some of which will also
apply here (in particular all those about anti-invariant properties in Partitioning
Cryptanalysis cf. [17,3,2]. This paper leads indeed to a new well-defined way to
prove a security of a cipher against invariant and/or malicious Boolean function
attacks, where one would attempt to prove that FE has no solution. Such a proof
can be done mathematically, or in a more automated way through formal algebra
(a Gro¨bner basis computation showing that there is no solution). A specific way
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of doing such a proof which should be easier than in general, would be to show
the impossibility at an early stage, for example show that elimination of just one
variable F is not possible, cf. Section 7.2. This sort of provable security results
could also be used to evaluate the distance between a secure cipher and one which
could be broken in the following way: for example for AES-128 one could prove
that starting from a certain value N no 1-round non-linear invariants which
eliminate N key variables exist, when all the other 128-N key bits are fixed.
Then the goal of the cipher designer would be to show that the cipher is secure
already for a very small N , which would give a very high level of confidence
about the full cipher.
5 How to Eliminate F
In this section we show a nice example where F gets completely eliminated. This
is an interesting generic or “milestone” example as we will see later: if we can
eliminate the constant F , we can also eliminate a lot more complex things7.
5.1 A Construction of a Multiple Invariant
We show how an invariant can be constructed in an ordered and systematic
way. We assume that D(9) = 32 and D(8) = 36 which implies d ← F + e and
h← F +Z1 + a and which mandates a sort of imperfect cycle8 of length 8 on 8
bits:
Fig. 3. Consequences of assuming that D(9) = 32 and D(8) = 36. F is used
twice and will be eventually eliminated. The intention is that the invariant will
not depend on F and neither on 4 additional bits which enter Z1.
We will decide a bit later (after writing the FE) where different inputs of Z1
need to be connected. We get a series of obvious transitions such as ce becomes
df which we would get in traditional Bi-Linear Cryptanalysis (BLC) [7], plus
a series of less obvious transitions due to the 2 assumptions D(9) = 32 and
D(8) = 36 such as bd becomes ce, hoping that the term Fc can be somewhat
cancelled later.
7 F is a constant known to the attacker. However if F could be totally eliminated
for the purpose of finding a non-linear invariant operating on X bits, other more
complex variables which depend on many key bits and on what happens in other
parts of the cipher, also CAN be eliminated, cf. Section 5.4 below.
8 Not a perfect cycle in the sense that it contains XORs with extra bits which are
not part of the cycle, cf. later Section 9.
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Fig. 4. A detailed explanation for our invariant which shows terms which cancel.
This analysis is done under our initial ad-hoc assumption that D(9) = 32 and
D(8) = 36.
This analysis of cycles on degree 2 monomials suggests to use the following
irreducible polynomial defined as the union of terms in black in both cycles:
P = a + b + c + ac + d + bd + e + ce + f + df + g + ag + eg + h + bh + fh
Knowing that each term in blue on Fig. 4 appears an even number of times,
we have already eliminated all terms with F . Now we add all the parts with
Z on both cycles, we expect that our FE will be: Z + Zc + Zg ≡ 0. This can
only work with Z 6≡ 0 if bits c and g are connected as inputs of Z1. This is
the moment at which we need to decide which bits will be connected to become
inputs of Z1, cf. earlier Fig. 3 and this can be done in any order, not necessarily
following our figure. For example we can have P (1) = 34 where c corresponds to
x34 and P (4) = 30 where g corresponds to x30. We are now able to generate a
long term key for which our invariant is going to work, for example:
827: P=34,32,25,30,19,28,18,35,31,33,23,36,24,22,5,1,
13,17,16,10,21,6,20,29,9,15,3 D=21,17,29,24,27,20,31,36,32
For this LZS we can now re-compute our FE which will have fewer unknowns:
P(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) = P(b, c, d, F + e, f, g, h, F + Z1 + e)
the fundamental equation is then as expected:
Z = Z(c + g)
and because FE does not depend on either F or L, we do not need eight
copies of it but just one. Here is one solution:
Z = e + be + ce + bce + bf + bcf + bef + bcef
This completes a construction of a non-linear round invariant. We have
checked that there is no linear invariant in any of the eight cases depending
on F, S1, S2, and therefore Linear Cryptanalysis (LC) does not work here. Our
non-linear invariant P works in all eight cases and therefore it propagates for
an arbitrary number of rounds for any key and for any IV.
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5.2 Observations about Our Multiple Invariant
We have obtained an invariant P on 8 bits 29-36 the key feature of which is
that it completely eliminates 4 bits which come from other parts of the cipher:
This capacity to ignore some bits is crucial in non-linear cryptanalysis because it
allows really to construct relatively simple invariants for very complex ciphers.
5.3 Pre-Conditions for Our Multiple Invariant
In fact the invariant obtained above can be constructed systematically.
Theorem 5.3 (Pre-conditions for Key 827). The invariant P = a+ b+ c+
ac+ d+ bd+ e+ ce+ f + df + g + ag + eg + h+ bh+ fh will occur for L = 0 or
L = 1, or for any L, each time the following set of conditions are satisfied:
D(9) = 32
D(8) = 36
(1 + c + g)Z(L,P [1− 5]) ≡ 0
Z 6≡ 0
Proof: The constraints D(9) = 32 and D(8) = 36 already mandate a cycle
between numbers 29-36 shown on Fig. 3 and they mandate all the transitions
of 4 which do not have a red question mark (?) sign, which depend on the FE.
Finally, we check that all terms in F are eliminated.
Corollary 5.3.1. In particular Z 6≡ 0 implies that two of the P (1 − 5) values
must be equal to bits 30 and 34, which correspond to letters ’c’ and ’g’.
5.4 A Transposed Version
Until now we have constructed an invariant for Z1 which eliminates F which is
known to the attacker (and it also ignores 4 more bits entering Z1). Now IF we
can eliminate F , we can do a lot better. We can simply transpose our invariant
from Z1 to Z4 and here it will eliminate g2, cf. Fig. 2 plus another 4 bits which
depend on at least 17 bits and 2 key bits in EXACTLY the same way. Instead
of eliminating a constant F known to the attacker we are now eliminating g2
which is a lot more complex to know, actually it depends on almost everything
else (and the attacker could not possibly know or determine g2).
Fig. 5. The same invariant transposed to Z4.
By doing so we get a stronger invariant. For example we found the following
LZS:
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847: P=32,22,26,14,21,36,30,17,15,29,27,13,4,23,1,8,35,20,
5,16,24,9,10,6,7,28,12 D=24,12,8,16,36,4,20,28,32
Here everything is transposed: the FE is WM + WQ + W = 0 and is the same
in all 8 cases for any F and any K,L and the transposed invariant is now
yM + zN +MO+NP + yQ+OQ+ zR+PR+ y+ z+M +N +O+P +Q+R
This works for a variety of Boolean functions, and we cannot directly trans-
pose the previous solution because the two key variables c, g are now M,Q at
different positions. A correctly transposed solution is then for example Z =
d+ cd+ bd+ bcd+ cf + bcf + cdf + bcdf . A crucial point here is that a very com-
plex part of the cipher enters this component at g2 and yet it could be totally
eliminated. Furthermore LZS 847 is a permutation on 36 bits secure against LC
and all previously known attacks on T-310 [10].
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6 Construction of Better Simultaneous Invariants
There are two approaches to this problem: combinatorial and algebraic. A com-
binatorial approach would be to generate countless examples and hope that up
to 8 equations have a simultaneous solution. A better -algebraic- approach ex-
ists: we will work through intersections of spaces of polynomials so that we only
consider equations where an invariant which works in multiple cases simultane-
ously can be guaranteed. Actually eliminating F , key bits a.k.a. K,L and what
happens in other parts of the cipher is the SAME problem: we want to construct
polynomial invariants which completely ignore a number of bits which would
ruin our cryptanalysis efforts.
6.1 Is It Possible to Have a Worst-Case Theorem?
This has been done previously in symmetric cryptanalysis: In [6] we discover that
an arbitrarily large number of bits in an arbitrary complex circuit can be elimi-
nated, which is guaranteed by a mathematical proof (worst case). The problem
however is, that the result of [6] was obtained under favorable circumstances:
with some redundancy in the number of bits exploitable for the attacker which
can be used to construct the invariant, including ciphers modified for this pur-
pose. In this paper we operate in a harder case: we want to generate invariants on
a small number of bits say 14 and yet eliminate say 5 bits per round which will
be key bits or bits coming from other parts of the cipher. Here the existence of
invariants will rarely by a worst-case result, rather that the FE happens to have
solutions which sometimes can be guaranteed through specific pre-conditions,
e.g. in Thm. 5.3 or Thm. 9.2.
6.2 Super Strong Invariants or How to Obtain a Worst-Case Result
Moreover sometimes it actually can be guaranteed that the FE is solvable and
that it eliminates F and all the key bits and all the other bits, and even the
main unknown Z. This happens when P is such that FE reduces to 0 (i.e. all
its coefficients are 0 for a given P). Then it is easy to see that for this invariant,
any Boolean function Z works. This does not say if some polynomials P where
FE actually reduces to 0 would exist. They do exist, cf. Appendix A.
This sort of invariant is considered out of the scope for the present paper as
typically they impose too many constraints on LZS and attack would work for
very few LZS. Moreover they are typically quite trivial and are not secure against
LC cf. Appendix A. Yet they work for Boolean functions which satisfy very
strict criteria and also for the original Boolean function Z used in 1980s. Here
no Boolean function can make this cipher setup secure against round invariant
attacks (and against partitioning attacks in general).
7 Simultaneous Invariants through Intersection of Spaces
In this section we show that the question of simultaneous solvability of FE for
several cases can be studied in terms of row-echelon elimination of specific vari-
ables in a set of multivariate polynomial equations. Previously we have elimi-
nated F plus 4 more bits and then transposed this result to eliminate a quantity
with even more complex dependencies. Here we go one step further.
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7.1 Construction of Invariants on Two Remote Parts of the Cipher
We are going to show the existence of an invariant on Z1 and Z4 which mixes bits
which sit at two opposite ends9 of the cipher, cf. Fig 2. These parts are connected
through Z2 and Z3 by a quantity called g27 and defined as g27 = g2+g7 cf. Fig.
2 which depends on an excessively large number of round input bits (at least 19)
plus the key bit S2. Without g27 none of the outputs on the right hand side we
use can be computed. Yet this connection g27 gets totally eliminated (so does
F and few other things). This leads to an invariant property which does NOT
depend on neither key bits nor on what happens in other parts of the cipher.
7.2 Construction of an Invariant with Z1 and Z4
We are going now to show how such invariants can be constructed essentially
from scratch, however aiming at connecting Z1 and Z4 specifically.
Fig. 6. Our ad-hoc assumption is D(2) = 36, D(3) = 32, D(8) = 8, D(9) = 12.
Here g27
def
= g2+g7 cf. Fig. 2. We aim at invariants on 8+8 bits which would not
depend on F, g27 and few more inputs of Z1, Z4 in blue are not yet connected.
Other inputs of Z1, Z4 will be used and their connections are decided at a later
stage.
We focus on 8+8 bits 29-36 and 5-12 pertaining to Z1 and Z4 only and
strictly avoiding anything between g2 and g7. We start by assuming the following
four constraints which implements a basic sort of “exchange” connection between
two opposite ends of the cipher. It also implements a cycle of size 4 on the D(i)
and a cycle of size 16 on the input/output variables, which we intend to be used
in our attack, and the whole could be viewed as 4 shift registers connected in a
loop, cf. Fig. 8 page 24.
9 We call it “spooky interaction” the two distant (as remote as only possible) parts
of the cipher “talk” to each other in terms of a polynomial invariant which mixes
variables from both sides. However their principal connection a.k.a. g27 is eliminated.
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
D(2) = 4 · 9
D(3) = 4 · 8
D(8) = 4 · 2
D(9) = 4 · 3
We can again generate cycles in the same way as in Section 5.1: transitions
are either natural e.g. bc← cd or consequences of the 4 conditions on D() above.
Similarly we ignore the boxes with blue crosses which we hope might eventually
be eliminated later inside the final FE which is not yet finalized. A detailed
analysis of these natural cycles as shown on Fig. 6 (and few more) leads to 8
natural clusters of monomials for P which most likely work together:
Fig. 7. A detailed analysis of transitions we aim at using in our invariant. The
boxes with crosses are terms we hope to cancel later. Transitions in red with
? depend on Z and will eventually work only if our final FE equation has a
solution.
7.3 Analysis of Polynomial Spaces
This gives 8 natural pre-FE equations, with the idea that a final P and final FE
is a fixed linear combination of these 8, which are exactly:
Wb+Fd+(b+f+N+R)(F+Z+L+Y+X+P6+P13+P20)+h(F+Z)+Fz+ P(F+Z)+WR
(L+Y+X+P6+P13+P20)(c+g+M+Q)+c(Z+W)+ZM+WQ
Fb+FN+W(d+P)+ (F+Z)(f+R)+ (F+Z+L+Y+X+P6+P13+P20)(d+h+z+P)
F(Z+W+a+e+y+O)+We+Zy+(Z+L+Y+X+P6+P13+P20)(W+a+e+1)
Z(d+z)+W(f+N)+F(d+h+z+P)+(F+Z+L+Y+X+P6+P13+P20)(b+f+N+R)
W(g+M)+Z(g+Q)+(L+Y+X+P6+P13+P20)(c+g+M+Q)
Z(b+N)+W(h+z)+F(b+f+N+R)+(F+Z+L+Y+X+P6+P13+P20)(d+h+z+P)
ZW+Z(a+e)+W(y+O)
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We start with a polynomial space of dimension 8. Now we observe that we need
to eliminate Fb and other similar monomials. A standard row-echelon proce-
dure forces us to XOR some equations and we obtain the following 6 linearly
independent equations:

XR +WR + (R + h+ z + P +N + f + b+ d)(P6 + P13 + P20) + Zb+ Lb+
Xb+ Lf + Y f +Xf + Lh+ Y h+Xh+ Zz + Lz + Y z +Xz + LP + Y P +XP+
WP + Y b+ Y N +XN + LR + Y R + Zd+ Ld+ Y d+Xd+Wd+ ZN +Wb+ LN
Zc+ Lc+ Y c+Xc+Wc+ (c+ g +M +Q)(P6 + P13 + P20)+
Lg + Y g +Xg + ZM + LM + YM +XM + LQ+ Y Q+XQ+WQ
WR +Wf +WN + Zh+ Zz + ZP + Zd+Wb
Lc+ Y c+Xc+ (c+ g +M +Q)(P6 + P13 + P20) + Lg + Y g +Xg+
+ LM + YM +XM + LQ+ Y Q+XQ+ Zg +Wg +WM + ZQ
Zb+ Zf +WP + ZR +Wd+Wh+Wz + ZN
ZW + Za+ Ze+Wy +WO
This stage is crucial for cipher designers, possibly one should be able to con-
struct a block cipher in such a way that the dimension of this set of polynomials
is already 0 [here it is 6 so we can do cryptanalysis]. Then we are going to
eliminate all products of P6 in the same way, which also leads to elimination of
numerous other monomials and this leads to a dimension 3, still not 0:
Zc + Wc + ZM + WQ + Zg + Wg + WM + ZQ
WR + Wf + WN + Zh + Zz + ZP + Zd + Wb
ZW + Za + Ze + Wy + WO
Finally it is possible to show that out of 23 − 1 = 7 possible linear combi-
nations of these P, only the first 2 out of 7 lead to solutions, this under the
condition that the cipher wiring P () is injective, or we get FE equations for
which the set of solutions is empty due to the simple fact that a Boolean func-
tion cannot annihilate variables which are not inputs of this function. This leads
to only 2 possibilities, out of which we have chosen to work with one:
P = bc+cd+dy+yz+zM+MN+eN+ef+fg+gh+hO+OP+PQ+QR+aR+ab+bg+ch+
dO + yP + zQ + MR + aN + be + cf + dg + hy + zO + MP + NQ + eR + af.
This P is irreducible and the FE is obtained by repeating the very same linear
transformations by which we have reduced the dimension from 8 to 2 above:
NW + PZ + RW + Wb + Wf + Zd + Zh + Zz
All we have now to do is to ensure through P () that various inputs which
appear in the FE above are connected to Z1 = Z or Z4 = W respectively,
for example f must by an input of W , therefore we need P (i) = 31 for some
i ∈ {21, . . . , 26}. This is exactly the moment at which we can decide all the
connections in blue on Fig. 6. Here is an example of a LZS where this P works:
714: P=11,7,30,29,33,1,20,17,2,15,14,27,36,24,18,8,19,
23,28,32,4,16,31,9,35,5,13 D=16,36,32,24,4,28,20,8,12
21
This example was found by the exact steps we enumerate below and by feeding
the resulting set of constraints on D() and P () to a SAT solver at the end. This
is done many times until we find a valid permutation on 36 bits.
Solving the FE. It remains to find a solution to NW + PZ + RW + Wb +
Wf +Zd+Zh+Zz ≡ 0. There is still some degree of freedom here in selecting
which bits will be inputs of W and Z though function P (). With LZS 714 above,
one possible solution is
Z = 1 + dc + cb + fb + b + c + de + df + db + e + f + d + eb.
We get another invariant which works for any number of rounds and any key.
7.4 An Invariant with Z1, Z2 and Z4
In the same way we have constructed another yet more complex invariant which
involves three Boolean functions Z1,Z2 and Z4 (and yet it deliberately avoids
Z3 and all the 120 secret key bits of type S2). We start with the following cycle
of size 6 (the size of the cycle increases and we are getting closer the maximum
possible size, cf. Fig. 8 page 24):
D(2) = 4 · 9
D(3) = 4 · 8
D(6) = 4 · 3
D(7) = 4 · 2
D(8) = 4 · 7
D(9) = 4 · 6
We repeat the same steps as before which leads to a polynomial space of
dimension 12 (instead of 8). After elimination of all monomials in F and P6 etc.
the dimension is still not 0, and we get the following plausible polynomial:
P = bl + cO + dP + mQ + nR + ao + bp + cy + dz + mM + nN + eo+
fp + gy + hz + iM + jN + ek + fl + gO + hP + iQ + jR + ak
and the FE is
Y c + Y g + Wk + Wo + ZM + ZQ
This FE allows to see that each of the three Boolean functions needs two
specific variables listed here as inputs, which we need to mandate using P ().
With all the constraints above we can now construct a possible LZS key:
124: P=6,36,5,18,10,16,24,12,20,34,30,31,7,21,13,11,
23,35,1,32,26,2,4,22,8,28,9 D=0,36,32,20,4,12,8,28,24
Finally, after fixing the exact placements of different inputs of Z, W and Y , and
not earlier, we can find a common solution for the FE. This is less trivial than
before because we have three instances of the SAME Boolean function, see Def.
3.2 page 10, and the solution depends on how the 3 sets of 2 bits are mapped
onto 6 bits. We selected an example LZS124 which is not quite trivial, and the
solution is: Z = 1 + dfe+ ba+ fa+ dbe+ fae+ db+ f + b+ df + ad+ ae+ d+
de + fad + fe + e + a + eb + bad + bae.
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It is possible to see that unlike in previous examples no solution Z of degree
2 exists. We see that as our examples become more complex, the complexity of
Z also increases. This is needed if eventually we wanted to construct a weak
cipher where Z would be a Boolean function with no apparent weakness.
8 From Invariants to Ciphertext-Only Attacks on T-310
Once we are able to construct a certain polynomial invariant property for our
block cipher breaking the cipher for at least some [weaker] LZS keys is not too
difficult10. The key observation cf. [18] is that typically our polynomial invariants
P will lead to partitioning the space of say 216 elements into two sets of rather
unequal sizes. Our experience shows that the sizes are frequently not equal with
some strong bias(!). More frequently than not11 as we are going to show below,
we are able to produce a strong pervasive bias on the state of our block cipher
which carries for any number of rounds.
8.1 How to Exploit a Non-Linear Invariant: Higher Order
Correlations
We first consider the invariant from Section 7.4:
P = bl + cO + dP + mQ + nR + ao + bp + cy + dz + mM + nN + eo+
fp + gy + hz + iM + jN + ek + fl + gO + hP + iQ + jR + ak
which is irreducible12, has 24 variables and a computer simulation shows that
the P = 0 in exactly 8519680 cases instead of 8388608 expected.
Even though any individual variable say a or N is typically not biased, neither
are pairs of variables, we observed that in each case there exists a relatively small
N such that for ANY subset of N out of 24, the joint probability distribution
of these N variables in not uniform. Moreover this N is not excessively large
in practice, for example the reader can easily verify that the event abcdef = 1
AND P = 0 for the above polynomial happens 0 times out of 133120 expected,
which demonstrates an extremely strong bias. Yet N = 6 is yet rather high.
8.2 More Concrete Examples of Higher Order Correlations
Another good example is the invariant of Section 7.3 where we have the partition
in two sets with 36864 and 28672 elements, and we have also checked that it
produces a serious bias with N = 5. For example when P = 0 yet the event
abcde = 1 happens 1280 times and the event abcd(e+1) = 1 happens 1024 times.
Moreover the event abcdef = 1 never happens. In addition we have also checked
that the polynomial P is irreducible and that there are no linear invariants true
with probability 1 and therefore we really found a non-trivial attack.
In Section 9.5 we present a better example working already with N = 3.
10 There are however some serious pitfalls in this process, cf. Section 8.4 and App. A.
11 This works for the invariants of Section 8.4 and Section 7.3. Now if partitions are
of equal sizes, cf. Section 9.3, the correlation attack we outline here will not work.
12 Otherwise we could be dealing with a multiple linear attack, see Appendix A.
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8.3 A Higher Order Correlation Attack
From here we can construct a strong correlation attack where the bias does not
depend on the number of rounds as follows. We assume that N = 5 produces
a bias as above. The value N = 5 if probably sufficient in practice. Now it is
sufficient that some Boolean function say Z3 in the next round13 takes some
subset of 5 bits out of our 24 as an input. It can be any subset, so that likelihood
this will actually happen is high. Then Z3 will take 1 more bits (presumably not
one of the 24) and with a high probability, the output of this Boolean function
will be biased at every encryption round. This will work if sufficiently many of
the 24 bits are used with Z3 or with Z2 (which in turn depends on how many
bits in Z1 and Z4 come from Z3 and Z2, which influence we were trying hard
to maximize!). Such permanently biased bits will inevitably lead to correlation
attacks where S1 and the special output bit xα actually used in the encryption
[10] will be connected through just a few biased bits. This, given the fact that the
same key bit S1 is repeated every 120 rounds, will inevitably lead to a ciphertext-
only correlation attack on T-310 and on a key recovery attack on 120 bits of S1
key (recovering S2 could be harder). Knowing that bits in any natural language
(not only German) in any reasonable encoding are always strongly biased, cf.
[11], from any such a bias we can infer concrete values of individual key bits S1
by majority voting. We obtain an attack of the sort which is extremely rare in
cryptanalysis: a correlation attack with recovery for at least 120 bits of the key,
where the correlation does NOT degrade as the number of encryption rounds
increases. It is also quite unique in another way: the biases which come from the
non-linear invariant are higher order biases on joint probability distributions of
a certain dimension N . They appear almost ex-nihilo, and they are NOT biases
which could be produced or understood within the strict framework of Linear
Cryptanalysis.
8.4 Important Remark - Avoiding Trivial Cases
It is important to see that NOT every partitioning in two spaces of unequal sizes
will work here. For example what we propose above will NOT work many of the
(so called stronger) invariants according to Section 6.2. An eminent example
of this is given in Appendix A where P = 0 in 3/4 entirely due to Linear
Cryptanalysis. The ultimate test is to see if a some set of N variables exhibits a
bias. There are plenty of trivial polynomials in non-linear cryptanalysis which are
products of linear factors and come from standard Linear Cryptanalysis (LC)
with multiple linear approximations, cf. Appendix A and Section 21 in [10].
Making sure that we are not in this case is however easy. Most of the time it will
be sufficient to check if the polynomial is irreducible and if not, we expect to
find some biases (there will be however exceptions to this rule). It is also good
when it is not symmetric, and it is useful if it contains no variables in linear
parts which would not appear in non-linear parts (otherwise it is likely to be
balanced).
13 Z3 is presently NOT constrained at all by the necessity for P to be an invariant.
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9 The Mystery Property and Invariants with P (20)
In this section we attempt to elucidate an old Cold War mystery question. There
exists an extensive 123 page “master” document on T-310 from 1980, where we
read that the round function of this cipher must be bijective [22]. This property
however is not required for encryption given that the cipher is used in a stream
cipher mode. Detailed mathematical proofs of this fact can be found in [11]
which paper also shows how to break this cipher in the otherwise case, which
would explain why the designers mandated this property. We have studied the
proofs in [11] and compared it to the whole of (extremely complex) specification
of the KT1 class of LZS [22], concerning about 90 % of keys used in real-life
state communications [10]. The following result appears as Thm. 5.1. in [12]:
Theorem 9.1 (KT1 Cycling Theorem). For every key in the class KT1 if
we replace the first value D(1) by P (20) and we divide all values by 4, we obtain
a permutation of the set {1, . . . , 9} with exactly one cycle.
Yet this property is NOT used nor it is required in the KT1 security proof of [11].
If so, what is this property for? Does it serve a purpose? We call it a “mystery”
property. In fact, it has a lot to do with our attacks. The main point is that
given the specific Feistel cipher structure in which each freshly created bit is
used exactly 4 times, absolutely every of our invariants here and also all 20+
pages of linear invariants constructed in [10] can be seen as acting on some set of
Di and bit P (20) (or e.g. P (27)) in a specific order eventually forming a closed
cycle. All invariants here and elsewhere [10,12] can be analysed in this way. Such
cycles are inevitable, and exist in every block cipher and they do NOT mean
that a specific cipher setup is weak. This is because the bits are on the way also
XORed with many other bits, cf. bits denoted as gi on Fig. 8 and on Fig. 2,
which depend on countless other bits in a very complex way. Only sometimes
we have some invariant attacks which eliminate these gi or some other bits
14.
Fig. 8. A typical “serial connection of shift registers” situation inside T-310 for
a long-term key of type KT1 cf. Thm. 9.1. The starting point is the key bit S1
(due to D(1) = 0). We also show what happens after the last bit re-enters the
cipher at P (20).
14 The whole point about all our invariants it to use a restricted set of bits and
eliminate SOME, not all of the gi, which can include elimination of whole intervals
inside Fig. 8, e.g. in Section 7.2, and eliminating also (preferably all!) the key bits
S1 and S2, in the same way as our previous attacks avoided F, g2, g27, Z3, S2 etc.
25
9.1 Short Cycles and Linear Cryptanalysis
This question of cycles already arises in Linear Cryptanalysis. We recall that our
cipher shift bits of the form 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 and then bit 4 is no longer used
[it is erased] or 25 → 26 → 27 → 28. Some cases are quite weak, for example
if we had d[9] = 0 we have 33 → 34 → 35 → 36 and 36 + S1 → 33, and we
get a simple linear invariant with one key bit S1. A more complex example is
Thm. J.1. in [10] which states that for some proportion of all LZS we have the
following linear approximation [9,13]→[10,14]→[11,15]→[12,16]→
[25,29,33]→[26,30,34]→[27,31,35]→[28,32,36]→[9,13]. Here Thm. J.1. in [10] states
that this linear approximation will occur when we have for example
(P (20)/4, D(3)/4, D(4)/4, D(7)/4, D(9)/4 = (7, 9, 8, 3, 4). We have a permuta-
tion on the set {3, 4, 7, 8, 9} if P (20) is identified with 8. Interestingly this cycle
and Thm. J.1. of [10] do not contradict our Thm. 9.1 above. This is because
instead of replacing D(0) by P (20) we replace D(8) by P (20) in Thm. J.1. cf.
[10]. Moreover Thm. J.1. of [10] shows more than one way in which this can be
made to work in spite of Thm. 9.1 and few more similar theorems can be found in
[10]. Overall we see that existence of invariant attacks does not contradict Thm.
9.1. In Thm. J.1. of [10] we have a cycle of length 5 and the invariant is trivial
(completely linear). Can we find a non-linear invariant with a cycle of length 9
and with the exact conditions of Thm. 9.1? Yes we can and two examples will
be shown below. In general given that Thm. 9.1 does not prevent linear attacks
cf. [10], it should not prevent their non-linear generalizations either(!). On the
contrary, we believe that Thm. 9.1 helps: to construct invariant properties of
a very specific shape. Moreover it is not true either, that (at least) Thm. 9.1
would prevent invariants which would avoid some key bits, cf. for example Thm.
J.1. and also LZS 778 in Table 23 p. 87 in [10]. As a proof of concept we are
now going to construct specific invariants with KT1 keys which therefore will be
totally compliant with Thm. 9.1.
9.2 An Invariant Using P (20) and Working for a KT1 Key
We present a proof of concept with a full cycle of length 9 and P (20). We have
first with paper and pencil imagined D with a cycle of length 9 compliant with
Thm. 9.1 and the simple invariant with 11 variables:
P = an + gn + u + v + w + x + O + P + Q + R
Then we assume D(2) = 36, D(4) = 8 and few more constraints cf. Thm. 9.2
below, aiming at the following sort of configuration:
Theorem 9.3 (KT1 quadratic invariant construction framework). For
each long term KT1 key s.t. D(2) = 36, D(4) = 8, P (20) = 16, {22, 23, 30, 35, 36} ⊂
{P (21), P (22), P (23), P (25), P (26)}, if the Boolean function is such that W =
a+an+ bo+gn+ho, and for any short term key on 240 bits, and for any initial
state on 36 bits, we have the non linear invariant, P = an + gn + u + v + w +
x + O + P + Q + R, which is true with probability exactly 1.0 for 1 round.
Proof: We need to distinguish variables such as P at the input called P0 and P
at the output called P1. We can successively XOR the expression a0n0 + g0n0 +
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u0+v0+w0+x0+O0+P0+Q0+R0 with W +a0+a0n0+b0o0+g0n0+h0o0 and
R1+g3+u0+W+a0 and x1+g3+O0 and we do all the trivial steps like v0 ← u1
and get the final result a1n1 + g1n1 + u1 + v1 + w1 + x1 + O1 + P1 + Q1 + R1.
Fig. 9. A detailed explanation of what happens with the pre-conditions specified
in Thm. 9.3. Connections of the inputs of Z4 are decided at a later FE solving
stage. Most of the inputs gi coming from other parts of the cipher get eliminated.
This result can be seen as a small modification of a linear invariant with an
interesting partitioning of products in W : half of them an + gn are connected
to inputs, and half are connected to outputs with bo + ho. Syntactically, un-
der very specific quite strong assumptions (above + KT1) it becomes easy to
just check that a specific invariant situation specified here just works. However,
aren’t we studying a set of constraints which is contradictory? If so we would
be able to prove potentially anything. A number of further “sanity” checks are
needed. Given the fact that the KT1 spec is very complex, do any LZS with all
these properties exist at all? These questions are very hard to answer syntac-
tically (or mathematically), we need to look at specific examples (cf. LZS 991
below). Moreover, on the computational side, can we actually find KT1 keys,
which satisfy all the constraints of Thm. 9.3. above, plus some 15 constraints
which define KT1 keys [22,10]? Then also, can they be such that no simpler
and trivial/linear invariants exists? Overall this may seem an incredibly difficult
problem. In fact in practice it was not so difficult. We did not even need to use
a SAT solver to solve this. One can also use the open source software tool key-
gen.py described in Appendix I.11 of [10] which allows to search for KT1 keys
with specific constraints on D() and P (). We found plenty of solutions(!). For
example this one:
991: P=34,4,33,8,31,28,5,27,9,26,32,19,24,18,21,12,17,
25,20,16,36,35,30,29,23,22,7 D=0,36,4,8,12,20,24,28,32
the FE is
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W + a + gn + ho + an + bo = 0
which equation has a unique solution: Z = a + ae + ce + bf + df .
9.3 A Balanced Invariant
It is easy to see that our last invariant P = an+gn+u+v+w+x+O+P+Q+R
is balanced, i.e. we do not obtain an internal bias inside the cipher. We are not
yet able to apply the ciphertext-only attack of Section 8.
9.4 A Biased Invariant which is Flawed
Interestingly, by the same method we found another KT1 key, which accidentally
has another more complex invariant, still quadratic, which is biased. Yet P is
not irreducible and this invariant is far from being OK, cf. Appendix A.
9.5 A Better Biased Invariant
We need to construct yet another invariant, such that P is irreducible and bi-
ased. Again we worked by paper and pencil aiming at an invariant with fewer
constraints, which unlike some earlier examples would not contradict Thm. 9.1.
D(9) = 4 · 6
D(6) = 4 · 8
(g + o)Y (P [8, 10, 11, 12]) ≡ mg + mo
Y 6≡ 0
Here inside our FE is already specified and the notation means that g and o
must be inputs with numbers in {8, 10, 11, 12} of Z2 = Y because 7 and 9 are
excluded by KT1 rules [10], and m can be some other input of Z2. Moreover F is
eliminated (similar as before, due to the choice of bits involved in our invariant).
Moreover we have used the peculiar property that P (6) = D(8) in KT1 spec cf.
[10] which is another place where we might think that the KT1 spec is actually
helping the attacker (same method could be used with D(7) and P (13) which
also come from KT1 rules!). Then we have done the usual analysis of cycles on
small monomials and combined 4 cycles, in order to generate a highly plausible
invariant:
P = eg + fh + eo + fp + gm + hn + mo + np
and with the same software as before we found a full KT1 key
551: P=17,4,33,12,10,8,5,11,9,30,22,24,20,2,21,34,1,25,
13,28,14,16,36,29,32,23,27 D=0,12,4,36,16,32,20,8,24
which gives the exact same FE which we have anticipated:
Y g + Y o + gm + mo
and one solution is Z = 1+d+e+f+de+cde+def . Moreover, P is irreducible
and we have checked that no linear approximations true with probability 1 exist
for LZS 551. Therefore this example is not degenerate in the sense of Appendix
A and cannot be obtained with multiple linear approximations.
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Furthermore, we need to evaluate the bias of this invariant. A quick calcu-
lation shows that we get a partition in two sets of unequal sizes. Furthermore,
we checked that already with N = 3 we obtain strong biases on N -tuples of
variables which can be used in our higher-order correlation attack cf. Section 8.
For example when P = 0 there are 40 events with efg = 1 and 16 events with
ef(g + 1) = 1.
9.6 How to Make GLC Work?
It is easy to see that even when deg(P) = 2 the space of GLC attacks cannot be
explored systematically: we have 2(
36
2 ) ≈ 2600 possible invariants P to try, and
it is not true that P must be symmetric. Both this paper and another recent
paper on this topic [25] have (temporarily) studied quadratic invariants mainly.
We also found countless more complex invariants. It seems that the ONLY way
we are aware of to at least partly explore this space, is through solving our FE
equation. Moreover, because as it seems, there are plenty of solutions of all sorts
and shapes, we need additional ad-hoc rules and heuristics. The main guiding
principle we adopted here is to search for invariants which eliminate specific
bits which strongly depend on the key and other parts of the cipher, e.g. in our
specific targeted elimination strategy in Section 7.3.
9.7 How Many KT1 Keys Can Be Broken?
We have eventually found several ways of generating invariants which are com-
patible with KT1 keys. Our last two invariants with P (20) in Section 9.2 and
in Section 9.4 work with a cycle of (maximal) length 9, same as with historical
keys and consistent with Thm. 9.1 and with ALL the very complicated 15+ KT1
rules, cf. [22,10]. We expect that with similar invariants one can break further
keys of type KT1 in a ciphertext-only attack scenario following Section 8. A
recent evaluation in Section 5.4. of [12] shows that the space of KT1 keys has
approximately 283 elements. Then it is easy to see that the proportion of KT1
keys compliant with the exact constraints imposed inside Thm. 9.3. is about
2−23. Then approximately 260 keys will have an invariant attack specified in
Thm. 9.3. In Section 9.5 there are less constraints and the number of LZS which
can be attacked will be very roughly about 283 · 9−2 · 36−2 ≈ 265.
9.8 Open Problems
In Section 7 we found two very good invariant attacks which are compatible with
a higher-order correlation attack in Section 8, however they are not compatible
with Thm. 9.1. We also found invariants which are compatible with Thm. 9.1
but not with our correlation attack. Eventually both are achieved in Section 9.5
for some 265 LZS. We conjecture that the actual number of KT1 keys broken
by the exact attacks of this paper should be closer to 280 than to 265 (out of
283 total). The attacker needs to specify MORE classes of invariants such as in
Section 9.5 and with P being irreducible and biased (cf. Appendix A), and add
the resulting probabilities. This sort of result just by the rules of probability
would imply a fair chance but no guarantee of also breaking some historical LZS
keys.
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10 Conclusion
In this paper we study cryptanalysis with non-linear polynomial invariants. We
show how a specific structure and internal wiring of more or less any block cipher,
starting from round ANFs, can be translated into a relatively simple “Funda-
mental Equation” (FE), which can be used to study which specific non-linear
invariants may exist (or not) for this cipher. Stronger invariants can now be
defined and characterized algebraically, P must be such that of FE reduces to
zero, cf. Section 6.2. In current research in Partitioning Cryptanalysis (PC) [17]
there are some impossibility results [3,2] but extremely few possibility results
[8]. Partitioning properties are extremely hard to find. Polynomial invariants are
way more intelligible. Our main contribution is to show that the attacker does
not need to randomly search for an interesting invariant P and a vulnerable
non-linear component Z. Specific polynomial invariants P and weak Boolean
functions which work together can now be determined – by solving our FE
equation(s). Our approach is constructive, completely general and can be ap-
plied to almost any block cipher: we first write the FE then based on ad-hoc
heuristics we determine a space of polynomials with a reduced dimension for P,
we substitute variables inside the FE(s), and we attempt to solve our FE(s).
We have constructed numerous concrete examples of non-trivial non-linear in-
variants which propagate for any number of rounds, and for any key and IV.
We anticipate that the success rate of this approach will be very different
for different families of ciphers. If just one round function is very complex and
uses many key bits, with too many constraints to satisfy simultaneously, our
approach is likely to fail, which could be used in security proofs, cf. Section 4.3.
Or solving FE will become computationally difficult, which would not mean that
the cipher is secure, rather it could be broken tomorrow at a cost of a larger
one-time pre-computation.
10.1 Cryptanalytic Applications: Biased Partitioning
We show that some invariants are trivial and result from Linear Cryptanalysis
and the polynomial P is a highly symmetric product of linear factors. In many
other cases, P is however not symmetric and irreducible. Then typically we
obtain a partition into two sets with similar yet unequal sizes. Such invariants
introduce a permanent and pervasive bias inside the cipher which is not
degraded with iteration of the cipher. This immediately leads to ciphertext-only
higher-order correlation attacks with key recovery such that their complexity
does NOT depend on the number of rounds, cf. Section 8.
10.2 Cryptanalysis of Stronger KT1 Keys
What is also quite incredible is that our attack works, at all, for at least one
real-life block cipher. With our methodology we are able to generate lots of
invariants of all sorts of shapes, more or less on demand, for example invariants
such that two remote parts of the cipher interact, in such a way that other very
complex parts which connect them are eliminated, and moreover key bits are
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also eliminated, cf. Section 7.2 and 7.4. Now, can we also construct invariants
which are compatible with Thm. 9.1 which characterizes a class of stronger KT1
keys which were specified by the designers? Yes, and as a proof of concept in
Section 9 we present three methods to construct KT1 keys with an invariant P
which propagates for any number of rounds and any key and IV .
10.3 On Vulnerable Boolean Functions
In most of our proof of concept examples the Boolean function is very special
or quite trivial and has generally a lower degree than expected. This is probably
not a problem and is due to the fact that we impose yet very few constraints
and our examples have been chosen for elegance and simplicity. An important
point is that at this moment we have artificially imposed that many inputs of
these Boolean functions are not used in our FE or could be eliminated totally.
This inevitably leads to quite peculiar Boolean functions. This problem will
probably go away as soon as more complex variants using more bits as inputs
are constructed. Moreover, in general, when the degree of P increases we expect
to find many more/stronger invariants P which work for a larger proportion of
the space of all Boolean functions on 6 variables. An open problem is to find
examples which would work in the worst case (for ANY Boolean function and
when the Fundamental Equation is reduced to 0) which would not be degenerate
in the sense of Appendix A.
Latest News - Added in 2019: A first attack and proof of concept showing
that when the degree of P increases one can attack indeed more or less arbitrarily
strong Boolean functions was found and published in December 2018, see [5].
10.4 On Success Rate of Our Attacks
We conjecture that for any Boolean function there exists one or several low degree
invariants P such that T-310 is broken by our ciphertext-only attack, and that
the percentage of LZS which are vulnerable to our attack should increase when
the degree of P grows. We also expect that the percentage of vulnerable Boolean
functions increases. In Section 9.7 we have estimated that at least 265 out of 283
of all possible KT1 keys will already be broken by the simple invariants which
we already found. Many more can yet be broken by the same attack and there
are some hopes that some actual historical KT1 keys could also be broken. We
have just started to explore an incredibly rich space of new attacks.
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A A Degenerate KT1 Invariant with FE Reduced to Zero
Not all non-linear invariants are good. The following quite special and degenerate
case was found accidentally during our search for KT1 keys in Section 9.2:
881: P=4,20,33,8,1,28,5,19,9,32,11,17,24,13,21,18,15,
25,12,16,35,22,23,29,36,30,34 D=0,36,4,8,12,20,24,28,32
Here the invariant P is a homogenous polynomial of degree 2 with 169 = 132
terms and 26 variables which is highly symmetric and not at all irreducible:
(n+b+p+r+t+v+x+z+N+P+R+T+V )(a+m+o+q+s+u+w+y+M+O+Q+S+U)
Furthermore it is possible to verify that if we call A the first sum, and if
we call B the second sum, AB is a non-linear invariant and also A + B is a
linear invariant for 1 round and the exact same cipher setup LZS 881. The
linear invariant produces a partition with two sets of equal sizes. For the non-
linear invariant the sizes are not equal and the probability that P = AB = 0
is exactly 3/4. Moreover, it is easy to see that this invariant works also for the
original Boolean function (actually the FE is reduced to 0 here) and also for
any other Z. This example remains however very special. Both A and B one
at a time are 2-round invariants with A 7→ B after 1 round. Then after one
round A · B becomes B · A which is the same, hence a quadratic invariant for
1 round exists. This is not a very good invariant: the 3/4 bias obtained here is
something which we would already be constructed by combining the two linear
approximations. A detailed study shows that up to 13 linear properties can be
made to hold simultaneously in T-310, cf. Section 21.16 in [10] and up to 10 can
be obtained for KT1 keys. This leads to plenty of non-linear invariants which can
be constructed from linear invariants (only if not using F, S1, S2 bits) which can
be multiplied (or added) together to form a variety of trivial invariants. Most
likely this can also be done with linear invariants using F, S1, S2 bits in such
a way, which would not trivial, that these bits will be eliminated totally, and
in the non-linear version only. Then the only invariants which do not depend
on key and IV bits would be non-linear invariants. However overall this is not
the sort of invariants we aim at constructing in this paper. As shown in this
paper, the most interesting invariants for a cryptanalyst will be those where P
is irreducible and yet the partitioning gives two sets of unequal sizes.
Remark: It is easy to construct degenerate examples also when P is irre-
ducible: for example through linear combinations by adding two or more prod-
ucts such as above. Typically in such cases the partitioning also gives two sets
of unequal sizes, which however do not give anything compared to the Linear
Cryptanalysis.
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B Frequently Asked Questions, Q/A, Discussion/Rebuttal
This Appendix section can be a seen as an alternative post-scriptum discussion
of this paper added after we have received some feedback from peer crypto
researchers at Eurocrypt 2019. In order to understand better this Q/A section,
it is important to see that many IACR conferences such as Eurocrypt 2019 have
now a formal rebuttal phase, and we were given an opportunity to answer (space
permitting) to the questions raised by the reviewers. The comments received
show among other, that maybe we need to explain certain things better, or that
our research is highly innovative and if the reviewers did not get some points,
many other people will not either, or that the PC has simply decided that this
sort of research cannot or should not at all15 be published at Eurocrypt for some
specific reasons.
This paper is in fact almost entirely identical to the paper we submitted to
Eurocrypt 2019 and all changes made were made in order to improve clarity.
Below we respond to the comments and provide short answer to these questions
in a straightforward direct way, hoping that our work can be better understood.
We have not added any new content here16 except for the sake of clarifying the
exact questions raised by the reviewers. The exact rebuttal text submitted to
Eurocrypt is included below. Not a word was added or removed. The language
is quite laconic and direct due to severe space limitations.
"a full definition": a FULL description of the block cipher inside T-310
is given TWICE: formulae p. 7, and Fig. 1+2+P/D
"known security recommendations"?? For this we cite 2017/440.
"I do not see how this implies attacks on a given instance":
works because two polynomials are equal. Invariant propagates
for any nb. of rounds and any key, strong pty.
"results on relevant ciphers"? Huge but indirect.
A new extremely rich algebraic method to analyse the security
of ANY block cipher:
FE method + RowEchelon elim sec.7.3.
We do not claim it breaks 3DES... yet please check!
How many attacks ever seen work for any number of rounds?
15 All the referees were very clear on this point, this paper should not be presented
at Eurocrypt, based on the ideas that T-310 is old or “not relevant”. In reality this
paper shows that the research community have never ever yet started studying the
topic of block ciphers properly and ignored the very existence of an incredibly vast
space of powerful and general attacks, a question reaching far beyond any block
cipher in particular.
16 This paper is past-looking, a record of our knowledge in October 2018, and we made
a deliberate choice not to add any new research here, except to note that our bold
conjectures in our conclusion Section 10.3 are now confirmed in [5].
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100% of crypto research have developed ignoring ABCs with
misplaced priorities: "black box" approximations for N rounds?
"more complex" and stronger attacks may exist, 1R=> game is over.
New white-box model, attacks are derived mathematically.
Stop ignoring complex attacks.
Huge space => any positive working examples valuable.
"variable names are taken from some source code"???
if so, they would be long, in fact 1 letter, cannot be shorter.
Real-life Z1 to Z4 are fixed. Yet researchers must explain HOW Z is chosen!
We show that super-weak choices exist! No idea WHEN exactly this old cipher
is secure => no reason to have an informed opinion on later block ciphers
e.g. DES. Design criteria must be revised: many pties of Z do NOT matter
for larger N, our work is relevant for ANY number of rounds.
"authors first pick an invariant and then see for which function Z1 to Z4
this is actually an invariant" NOT like this! We do sth fundamentally stronger.
Our invariants eliminate variables, and quite many variables. When we use a
variable say M, our invariant ELIMINATES tens of variables needed to compute M!!
At the end an attacks may exist, FE yielding the answer, but P and the FE
eliminate plenty of vars. Cf. Sec 7.2 with vars from 2 opposite sides,
half depend on absolutely EVERYTHING inside.
Yet these bits get eliminated.
"relevant ciphers"???
THE most important government block cipher for the whole of the Cold War
is not relevant for a crypto conference? Father and early cousin
of all block ciphers ever seen? Used by a totalitarian regime?
The research community have never found a complex sophisticated attack
on block ciphers, only simple ones s.t. space is small [64 bits/small HW].
No idea about even how a complex attack on a complex block cipher
could even look like.
Also almost never studied ciphers with low data extraction rate.
Scientific challenge: 1000S of of rounds => most academic attacks do not work,
ours may work cf. Section 8 - ciphertext-only.
"Luckily, cryptographic research has progressed since the 1980’s", maybe...
Or proper research on the security of block ciphers have never yet started!
Bootstrapping problem: no good examples were known.
We still don’t know how to select Z for T-310 and never yet studied
99.99999% of attacks where this would matter.
